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ABSTRACT: The current European crisis shows a crucial disjunction between the expectations 
of  EU citizens and the institutional forms of  political integration available to them. The crisis 
imposes challenges to the EU integration process, which sees its legitimacy questioned, above all in 
the eyes of  the citizens of  Member States undergoing intervention, who live with harsh restrictions 
and low expectations of  improvement. EU citizens have never been so attentive to the developments 
of  the EU integration – as testifies the rejection demonstrated in May 2014 elections to EU 
Parliament, now counting over 100 anti-EU voices. In this context, it is important to scrutinize 
whether the developing of  an EU citizenship as “citizenship of  rights” could perform some role 
in this scenario, putting it into perspective in order to grasp its effects on the legal nature of  the 
EU polity. The status of  EU citizenship is constructed around the paradigm of  individual rights. 
Being an EU citizen basically means one is the holder of  rights protected by the EU legal order 
– especially fundamental rights. Therefore, it is important to know to what extent the culture of  
rights has been strengthened by the change legal status of  the Charter of  Fundamental Rights of  
the European Union (CFREU) following the entry into force of  the Lisbon Treaty in December 
2009.1 In short, the text aims at knowing in which measure the fundamental rights dynamics in 
times of  crisis affect the EU integration process itself.
KEYWORDS: crisis - EU citizenship - fundamental rights - citizenship of  rights - EU polity.
*Professor of  University of  Minho (Braga/Portugal) and Jean Monnet Chair in EU law.
**Communication Officer at the Lifelong Learning Platform, Dottore Magistrale in Law and 
Politics of  EU integration. 
1 This question directed some of  the questions of  the Questionnaire General Topic 2 - Union 
citizenship: development, impact and challenges, The XXVI FIDE Congress (Copenhagen, 2014). 
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1. Crossing the border from national to EU citizenship2 
Citizenship rights were always a result of  individuals belonging to a particular 
political community. But EU citizenship, unlike national citizenship, does not 
presuppose the polity to which the citizen belongs – it creates that community 
through the exercise of  rights.3 In the context of  EU integration, the debate on 
citizenship arose in the 70’s aiming to provide a set of  civil, political and social rights 
to the nationals of  a Member State acting upon their economic freedoms in another 
Member State, allowing them to be on equal terms with the nationals of  the host 
Member State, and in this way promoting an equal standard of  the legal positions of  
nationals of  Member States. Hence, EU citizenship was always connected with the 
principle of  nationals’ equality in the different Member States – they would benefit 
from the rights and be subject to the duties set out in the Treaties.4 And this idea 
of  a community of  rights and duties (established by the EU and not by a singular 
Member State) promotes a sense of  belonging to the Union among individuals. That 
is, EU citizenship is built and developed through the exercise of  rights – and for this 
the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (ECJ) case law, issued at the request for 
preliminary rulings by national courts, has weighed immensely. 
Since the notion of  citizenship was traditionally connected with preserving 
Nation-States (distinguishing between “we” and the “other”), the recognition of  EU 
citizenship through the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty of  the European Union – TEU, 
1992) raised the following questions: 1) «what kind of  political community could be 
created beyond the Nation-State?», 2) «what relationship would it have with national 
political communities?», 3) «who would its members be and what rights would they 
have?» – all issues that are at the core of  European integration as a political project, 
and are still a major concern nowadays.5 In fact, because EU citizenship does not 
serve to preserve Nation-States and refers to a large number of  nationalities, it could 
not have – and it does not have – the same nature as national citizenship, being 
original and essentially an inclusive citizenship.6 In his Opinion in the Rottmann case,7 
2 This text was developed following Alessandra Silveira’s presentation at the international conference 
“Shattering Iberia - cultural responses to an ongoing crisis”, organized by UC Berkeley Department of  
Spanish and Portuguese, University of  California - Berkeley, USA, March, 5, 2014. It appeared as a 
result of  a reflection on the theme highlighted in Claudia McKenny Engström’s Master thesis “The 
evolution of  Union citizenship in ECJ case law. A contribution to the definition of  the legal nature of  the European 
Union”, directed by Alessandra Silveira and presented at the Université Montpellier 1, Universitat 
Autònoma de Barcelona, Università Degli Studi di Milano and Uniwersytet Szczecinski (Joint 
European Master “Law and Policies of  European Integration: European Constitutional Law and Multilevel 
Constitutionalism”) on July, 2014.
3 See E. Poptcheva, Multilevel citizenship. The right to consular protection of  EU citizens abroad, Peter Lang, 
2014, 87-88.
4 As set out in article 9 TEU and article 20(2) TFEU.
5 Such questions were raised by D. Chalmers, C. Hadjiemmanuil, G. Monti and A. Tomkins, European 
Union Law. Text and materials, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 561-562, where one reads: «the 
debate surrounding citizenship concerns the nature of  political community».
6 About the ideas of  inclusion and exclusion in the context of  European citizenship see C. Barnard, 
The substantive law of  the EU. The four freedoms, Oxford University Press, 2007, 411. For a perspective 
of  EU citizenship as a «constructive, transformation and multiple identity» see A. Verhoeven, The 
European Union in search of  a democratic and constitutional theory, Kluwer Law International, 2002, 168 
and ff. In regards to the connection between citizenship and the «constitutional framework» of  the 
Union and its growth as a political community see J. Shaw, Law of  the European Union, Palgrave Law 
Masters, 2000, 381 and ff.
7 Judgment Rottmann, Case C-135/08, March 2, 2010. 
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Advocate-General (A.G.) Poiares Maduro tries, in some way, to address the questions 
referred above on the relationship between nationality of  a Member State and EU 
citizenship. As explained by Poiares Maduro, EU citizenship assumes a Member 
State nationality,8 but is also a legal and political concept independent of  the concept 
of  nationality, in the sense that it presumes the existence of  a political connection 
between EU citizens, although it is not a relationship of  belonging to a people. This 
political connection unites the European peoples and results from the reciprocal 
commitment of  opening their political communities to other European citizens and 
building a new form of  civic and political solidarity on a European scale. As has been 
pointed out – we are reminded by Poiares Maduro referring to Joseph Weiler –, the 
radically innovative character of  the concept of  EU citizenship lies in the fact that 
«the Union belongs to, is composed of, citizens who by definition do not share the 
same nationality».9 Hence, EU citizenship is not limited by a particular nationality 
and is the platform for a new political sphere from where rights and duties stipulated 
by the EU – and not from a Member State – emerge.10
It was not for another reason that the debate about EU citizenship developed 
in parallel (and ended up being confused) with the discussion of  the protection of  
the fundamental rights within the Union: if  European citizens are the holders of  
rights set forth in the Treaties, they are also holders of  fundamental rights recognised 
by the EU legal system – whether they exercise economic freedoms or not. Art. 20 
(2) of  Treaty of  Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU) provides that EU 
citizens shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. 
A non-restrictive interpretation of  that provision suggests that EU citizenship not 
only includes the rights that traditionally have been attached to it11 (as the right to 
vote in European Parliament elections or to apply to the European Ombudsman) 
but also relates it to the protection of  fundamental rights. So, being an EU citizen 
basically means one is the holder of  rights protected by the European legal system 
– maxime fundamental rights. The close connection between EU citizenship and the 
protection of  fundamental rights was inferred by the Advocates General of  the ECJ 
even before its formal protection in the Treaties12 – that is visible in A.G. Jacobs’ 
Opinion in the Christos Konstantinidis case.13 Faced with the question of  knowing if  a 
person who acts upon their freedom of  movement could, in the terms of  Community 
Law at the time, oppose the harmful treatment of  their fundamental rights, the A.G. 
8 As stated by the EU Treaties (Art.9 TUE) is EU citizen who has the nationality of  a Member 
State. Therefore, «Union citizenship is a legal status stablished by the EU Treaties, which is 
additional to national citizenship (and dependent upon it)». See N. Shuibhne, J. Shaw, “General 
report”, in Union citizenship: development, impact and challenges. The XXVI FIDE Congress in Copenhagen 
2014, U. Neergaard, C. Jacqueson, N. Holst-Christensen (eds.), Congress Publications, Vol. 2, DJOF 
Publishing, 2014, 65.
9 J. Weiler, The Constitution of  Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 344. 
10 For all, Judgment Rottmann, Case C-135/08, September 30, 2009, A.G. Opinion, para. 23. With a 
common position see C. Barnard, The substantive law of  the EU. The four freedoms, Oxford University 
Press, 2007, 458, where one reads: «European citizenship does allow individuals a multiplicity of  
associative relations based on manifold economic, social, cultural, scholarly, and even political 
activities, irrespective of  the traditional territorial boundaries of  the European nation States, 
without binding individuals to a particular nationality».
11 Subparagraphs a), b), c) and d) of  the same Art. 20 (2) of  TFEU. 
12 For this see C. Closa Montero, “Martínez Sala and Baumbast: an institutionalist analysis”, in The 
past and future of  EU Law, M. Poiares Maduro/L. Azoulai (eds), Hart Publishing, 2010, 395.
13 Judgment Konstantinidis, Case C-168/91, December 9, 1992, A.G. Opinion, para. 42 and 46.
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supported the right to assert a «civis europaeus sum» and claim this condition to oppose 
any violation in a person’s fundamental rights.
Therefore, mobility does not boil down to indicators of  economic 
competitiveness and development – it implies the exercise of  fundamental rights:14 
«When citizens move, they do so as human beings, not as robots. They fall in love, 
marry and have families».15 So, the idea that EU citizenship would allow access to 
the EU standard of  fundamental rights’ protection would be revisited six years later 
by the same A.G. Jacobs in the Bickel and Franz case,16 where he claims that EU 
citizenship «implies a community of  rights and duties that unite EU citizens by a 
common connection that is transcendent to the issue of  Member State nationality».17 
The idea caused reservations under the fundamental rights’ theory: first because 
EU citizenship was originally conceived as a migrant citizenship, associated with the 
freedom of  movement, and the fundamental rights should not depend on personal 
mobility; second, because EU citizenship was reserved to Member State nationals, 
thus excluding third country nationals from the protection of  fundamental rights 
granted by the EU. For those reasons, EU citizenship should not be mixed up and 
confused with the protection of  fundamental rights.18 However, convergence was 
inevitable. The objections were suppressed by the evolution of  ECJ case law in 
relation to the expansion of  the scope of  application of  EU citizenship, as well by the 
progressive uniformity between nationals and foreigners concerning the enjoyment 
of  fundamental rights present in the EU Member States’ legal orders – i.e., under 
Member-States legal orders and under the EU legal order the fundamental rights of  
citizens tend to be rights of  all.
So, ever since Maastricht Treaty, at least, European citizenship and European 
identity were seen as pivotal to the process of  integration: that is, they were used as 
concepts overarching a certain pluralism that could be accommodated as internal and 
navigated through subsidiarity. But the current crisis imposes challenges to the EU 
integration process which sees its’ legitimacy questioned, above all in the eyes of  the 
citizens of  Member States undergoing intervention, who live with harsh restrictions 
and low expectations of  improvement. So what is the status today of  EU citizenship 
in the context of  the resurfacing of  the local, and the resurgence of  some hostility 
between nations across the north/south divide of  the Eurozone? EU citizens have 
never been so attentive to the developments of  the EU integration. And because of  
that, the most serious mistake of  the majority of  citizenship and fundamental rights 
actual analysis is that it tends to underestimate the systemic transformative potential 
of  the crisis. 
As recently explain Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Jo Shaw, «As both a status and an 
ideal, Union citizenship stands at the interface of  integration and constitutionalism, 
and is a barometer for key trends and influences at the current crossroads between 
the Member States and the European Union».19 On its turn, the current crisis 
14 In this sense, see S. Weatherill, “Cases and materials on EU Law”, chapter 15 (European citizenship 
within an area of  freedom, security, and justice), Oxford University Press, 2007, 477 and ff.
15 Judgment Zambrano, Case C-34/09, September 30, 2010, A.G. Opinion, para. 128.
16 Judgment Bickel and Franz, Case C-274/96, November 24, 1998.
17 Judgment Bickel and Franz, Case C-274/96, March 19, 1998, A.G. Opinion, para. 23.
18 In this sense, see D. Chalmers, C. Hadjiemmanuil, G. Monti, A. Tomkins, European Union Law. 
Text and materials, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 561; A. Verhoeven, The European Union in search 
of  a democratic and constitutional theory, Kluwer Law International, 2002, 185-187.
19 N. Shuibhne, J. Shaw, “General report”, in Union citizenship: development, impact and challenges. The 
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questions the relation of  national politics to European politics and puts the question 
of  what principles and values are substantial enough to underpin a conception of  
the common good. Therefore, the main question in this context is whether the crisis 
shows some crucial disjunction between the expectations of  EU citizens and the 
institutional forms of  political integration available to them – and if  the developing 
of  a broad notion of  «citizenship of  rights» could perform some role in this scenario. 
It is worth recalling that the political processes are broader and deeper than the 
formal institutions charged to regulate them. And the most crucial decisions relating 
the public life are not taken by parliaments – they are taken in a domain standardized 
by collective consciousness.20
2. The gradual evolution of  EU citizenship through the notion 
of  movement
As we said above, EU citizenship is strongly tied to the economic origins of  
the European integration. Therefore, the rules which applied to it followed the 
logic enshrined in the freedom of  movement. Upon consecration of  the status 
of  citizen of  the Union to all Member State nationals with the Maastricht Treaty, 
the CJEU soon seized the opportunity to disconnect this novel status from pure 
market considerations. Citizenship thus started to find its true meaning.21 However, it 
remained linked to its national origins, in the light of  both procedural and substantial 
conditionality set by the idea of  movement. But in its latest jurisprudence on 
citizenship matters – especially in the Rottmann22 and Zambrano23 cases – the CJEU 
has taken a step away from its traditional reasoning based on movement, allowing 
situations presenting no cross-border element or evident link with EU law aside 
from the status of  citizen of  the Union, to enter the scope of  Union law, raising a 
debate on the scope of  application of  EU law. 
«One of  the most far reaching revolutions in case-law»24 was inaugurated in 
2010 with the landmark decision delivered in the Rottmann case, followed one year 
later by the no less groundbreaking Zambrano ruling, in which the ECJ finds that 
deprivation of  the enjoyment of  the substance of  rights conferred to Union citizens 
constitutes a link with Union law. These cases are revolutionary for two reasons: 
first, they entered the scope of  EU law although they presented no cross-border 
element, neither physical nor normative; second, there was no link with EU law as 
both concerned matters under exclusive Member State competence, the rules on 
attribution and loss of  nationality in Rottmann, and rules on immigration in Zambrano. 
Since EU law is not intended to be omnipresent,25 the cross-border logic was used 
XXVI FIDE Congress in Copenhagen, 2014, U. Neergaard C., Jacqueson, N. Holst-Christensen (eds.), 
Congress Publications, Vol. 2, DJOF Publishing, 2014, 66.
20 In this sense see C. Geertz, The interpretation of  cultures, New York, Basic Books, 1973.
21 To know how did one move from a market citizenship (based on economic freedoms), to a social 
citizenship (based on social rights), so that one could finally reach a republican citizenship (based on 
active participation and involvement) see C. Barnard, The substantive law of  the EU. The four freedoms, 
Oxford University Press, 2007, 410.
22 Judgment Rottmann, Case C-135/08, March 2, 2010.
23 Judgment Zambrano, Case C-34/09, March 8, 2011.
24 D. Kochenov, “The present and future of  Union citizenship. A bird’s eye view of  the legal 
debate”, in Jean Monnet Working papers, NYU, 2012, http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/
papers/12/documents/JMWP02Kochenov.pdf.
25 Judgment Kremzow, Case C-299/95, May 29, 1997. 
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by the ECJ in its delimitation of  the scopes ratione materiae of  the coexisting national 
and EU legal orders, the largely criticized downfall of  which was the creation of  
reverse discriminations – or discrimination against one’s own nationals, between the 
so-called static and migrant/mobile citizens, as we will see infra.
This is the essential issue in the Rottmann and Zambrano case law: is it necessary to 
move so that one can rely on the Treaties regarding citizenship and rights attached to 
it? Such uncertainty leads to an understanding of  the problem of  the so-called «purely 
internal situation» (which would not fall within the scope of  EU law) and the way in 
which the ECJ has addressed the question (concerning the reverse discrimination that 
it brings). This problem was faced by A.G. Tesauro in the Lancry case, concerning 
the obstacles to the free movement of  goods, people, services and capital limited to 
the territory of  a single Member State. As he said: «An experienced lawyer will also 
notice the paradox of  a single market in which barriers to trade between Portugal 
and Denmark are prohibited, whilst barriers to trade between Naples and Capri are 
immaterial».26 As A.G. Poiares Maduro explains in the Carbonati case, the expression 
«reverse discrimination» refers to the situations in which nationals of  a Member-State 
who did not use their freedoms of  movement find themselves in a less favourable legal 
situation than the nationals of  other Member States who did exercise those freedoms.27
Therefore, the real question nowadays about EU citizenship is the urgent 
clarification of  the scope of  application of  the fundamental rights in the European 
Union. It derives from ECJ case law, confirmed by Art. 51 of  CFREU, that the 
fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order may be invoked when the 
measure at stake belongs to the material field of  application of  EU law.28 And the 
field of  application of  EU law is the one that derives from its competences, as 
stated in Art. 2 to 6 of  TFEU. But from this provision results an uncomfortable 
difference in treatment between the so-called mobile citizens (who exercise their 
classic EU rights/economic freedoms and therefore benefit from the EU standard 
of  fundamental rights’ protection) on the one hand, and static citizens (who do 
not exercise economic freedoms, and for that reason do not benefit from the EU 
standard of  fundamental rights’ protection) on the other. The current EU standard 
of  fundamental rights’ protection seems incompatible with the phenomenon of  
«reverse discriminations». This phenomenon implies the differentiation of  treatment, 
even in relation to the fundamental rights, between mobile and static citizens – and 
seems in contradiction towards Art. 18 TFEU, according to which discrimination 
based on nationality is prohibited.
That result would no longer be compatible with the actual context of  a 
citizenship of  rights and with the trend to match legal positions.  It was predictable 
that the entry into force of  the CFREU would cause such adjustments. However, 
the consequences of  this new unfolding of  fundamental rights in the European 
integration process are yet to be seen. Since the Zambrano case, the ECJ has been faced 
26 Judgment Lancry, Case C-363/93, June 28, 1994, A.G. Opinion, para. 28.
27 Judgment Carbonati, Case C-72/03, May 6, 2004, A.G. Opinion, para. 55.
28 See Judgment Klensch (Joined Cases 201/85 and 202/85) November 25, 1986, para. 10 and 11; 
Judgment Wachauf, Case 5/88, July 13, 1989, para. 22; Judgment Bostock, Case C-2/92, March 24, 1994, 
para. 16; Judgment Booker Aquaculture (Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00) July 10, 2003, para. 68. It is 
firm ECJ jurisprudence that Member States must respect fundamental rights protected by EU law: 1) 
when applying EU law, 2) when temporarily derogating EU norms, 3) when transposing EU directives, 
4) when adopting national measures of  execution of  European legislation, 5) when applying national 
law that entries in the material field of  application of  EU law.
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with the impact of  fundamental rights (in particularly the protection of  family life) 
in determining the meaning and the scope of  EU citizenship as set out in the Art. 9 
TEU and 20 TFEU. The ECJ was challenged to give the concept of  EU citizenship a 
practical dimension in connection to the problem of  fundamental rights’ protection 
within the EU, i.e., admitting EU citizenship as a platform that allows a Member 
State national to gain access to the EU standard of  fundamental rights’ protection, 
avoiding, this way, the EU citizen to find fictitious or hypothetical connections with 
the economic rights to benefit from that legal protection.29
The Zambrano case law involved ascertaining if  EU citizenship allows an ascending 
family member of  an EU citizen (minor and static, i.e., that has never exercised an 
economic freedom) the right of  residence in the Member State in which the child was 
born. The parents of  this EU citizen (minor and static) are third country nationals, 
therefore the situation involves Member States’ immigration competences and for this 
reason it apparently would not enter the scope of  application of  the EU law. Moreover, 
the ECJ held that Art. 20 TFEU «precludes a Member State from refusing a third 
country national upon whom his minor children, who are European Union citizens, 
are dependent, a right of  residence in the Member State of  residence and nationality of  
those children, and from refusing to grant a work permit to that third country national, 
in so far as such decisions deprive those children of  the genuine enjoyment of  the substance of  the rights 
attaching to the status of  European Union citizen» (emphasis added).
The uncertainty and some apparent lack of  coherence in jurisprudence 
pertaining to EU citizenship have not spared doctrine from virulent criticism towards 
the ECJ as much as among itself, especially regarding recent case law. One side roots 
itself  in a comfortable status quo following a conservative tradition, deploring the 
«drastic disrespect for written legal rules»;30 the other, claims to provide a reasoned 
analysis sometimes espousing «an unjustifiable extension of  the EU’s powers justified 
by the extremely important problems the Court has to deal with which requires 
a sympathetic understanding of  the Court’s attempts to engage the problems in a 
constructive manner and especially in the absence of  any clear alternative».31 If  it 
can be argued that the scope ratione materiae has not been extended, these cases are 
nonetheless the symbol of  the full deployment of  EU citizenship’s capacity.
They are bringing the EU legal system face to face with the meaning and scope 
of  EU citizenship: does it serve only to support the freedom of  movement of  
economically active citizens, or is it connected with a uniform set of  rights and duties, 
typical of  a Union based on the rule of  law, in which fundamental rights perform 
an essential role?32 Since Union citizenship «can be seen as a microcosm of  some of  
the key variables at play within the story of  EU integration more generally»,33 and it 
is «destined to be the fundamental status of  nationals of  the Member States»,34 what 
are then the implications of  a citizenship divorced from the idea of  movement on 
the dynamics which animate the Union? And is it already time to move on?35
29 See Judgment Zambrano, Case C-34/09, September 30, 2010, A. G. Opinion, para. 167.
30 K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, “Comment to the Ruiz Zambrano case”, in CMLR, 48, 2011. 
31 D. Kochenov, “A real European citizenship: a new jurisdiction test, a novel chapter in the 
development of  the Union in Europe”, in Columbia Journal of  European Law, Vol. 18, 2011, 93. 
32 Judgment Zambrano, Case C-34/09, September 30, 2010, A. G. Opinion, para. 3.
33 J. Shaw, The transformation of  citizenship in the European Union. Electoral rights and restructuring of  the 
political space, Cambridge University Press, 2007.  
34 Judgment Rudy Grzelczyk, Case C-184/99, September 20, 2001, para. 31.
35 Judgment Zambrano, Case C-34/09, September 30, 2010, A. G. Opinion, para. 139.
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3. Realigning the condition of  movement through the 
new condition of  enjoyment of  the substance of  rights: a 
transformation in nature of  EU citizenship
It is not easy to identify all of  the implications arising from this seminal ECJ 
case law which has emancipated EU citizenship from the constraints inherent in its 
free movement origins.36 Although these judgments constitute binding precedent, 
they are not yet ECJ settled case law, which advises us to wait for new developments, 
namely because the ECJ case law is reluctant to define the essential content of  
EU citizenship37 – and usually evolves through a succession of  breakthroughs and 
setbacks. As is clear, «the resulting intervention of  EU law in purely internal situations 
is a truly ground-breaking constitutional development» and in subsequent case law 
the ECJ «placed firm emphasis on the exceptional nature of  that intervention, 
stressing a threshold of  forced departure from the territory of  the Union before the 
genuine enjoyment of  the substance of  the citizenship rights could be considered 
a risk».38 39 So, the evolution at work regarding the cross-border conditionality thus 
calls for an assessment of  the reasons and effects of  purely internal situations in the 
cohabitating legal orders and an a contrario analysis of  their disappearance. With these 
perspectives in mind, we can then move to measure the degree of  integration as it is 
and what inputs its future might require.
3.1. Measuring the effects of  the disappearance of  cross-border 
conditionality 
The condition of  movement has two sides to it. Firstly, it can be justified as a way 
of  containing the scope ratione materiae of  EU law (3.1.1); secondly, it can be criticized 
for being a mere procedural requirement which hinders citizens from accessing the 
substance of  EU law in spite of  the fundamentality of  their status (3.1.2). In both 
cases are revealed the constant tensions between rights and competences. 
3. 1. 1. Purely internal situations or the manifestation of  the principle of  
conferral of  competences regulating the relation between Member States and EU
In this first scenario, purely internal situations draw the line between the two 
EU and national legal orders. Prohibiting Union from applying in wholly internal 
situations is tantamount to declaring EU law is not omnipresent, that it does not 
include all situations a citizen might find him or herself  in because national and EU 
legal orders are distinct from each other, although they cohabitate in an intricate 
multi-level system. Purely internal situations, presenting no extraneous element in the 
absence of  a cross-border link, have been said to be the emanation of  the principle 
36 See K. Lenaerts, “Civis europaeus sum: from the cross-border link to the status of  citizen of  
the Union” in Online Journal on free movement of  workers within the European Union, 3, 2011, 7, http://
ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=475&langId=en&furtherPubs=yes.
37 See D. Kochenov, “EU citizenship. New questions in need of  an answer”, in Alessandra Silveira, 
Pedro Froufe, Mariana Canotilho (eds.), Citizenship and solidarity in the European Union – from the Charter of  
Fundamental Rights to the crisis, the state of  the art, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2013. A. Wiesbrock, “Disentangling 
the ‘Union citizenship puzzle’? The McCarthy case”, in European Law Review, 36, 2001, 862.
38 N. Shuibhne, J. Shaw, “General report”, in Union citizenship: development, impact and challenges. The 
XXVI FIDE Congress in Copenhagen 2014, U. Neergaard, C. Jacqueson, N. Holst-Christensen (eds.), 
Congress Publications, Vol. 2, DJOF Publishing, 2014, 141.
39 See Judgment Dereci, Case C-256/11, November 11, 2011, para. 68.
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of  conferral of  competences. Because they are the expression of  Member States’ 
«power to regulate the factors of  production by reference to policy objectives other 
than those recognized as legitimate by EU law»,40 others have argued they enshrine 
the principle of  subsidiarity.41
The most salient downfall of  this approach, as we explain above, it is to be 
found in reverse discrimination. Reverse discriminations can be defined as situations 
in which a static citizen is «left in a worse position» than a migrant citizen, «even 
though in all other respects their circumstances may be similar or identical»;42 or as 
situations in which a Member State discriminates against his own nationals.43 These 
situations are the result of  the interaction between EU and national law, between 
two coexisting legal orders. According to some, they are an aberration vis-à-vis EU 
citizenship, and the perfect illustration of  the almost ludicrous juridical system 
designed to maintain a cross-border element supporting the concept of  purely 
internal situations. When the Union inaugurated its own citizenship, the number 
of  situations presenting a reverse discrimination considerably increased, since EU 
citizenship multiplied the possibilities of  benefiting from protection under EU law 
from a ratione personae perspective, now including all Member State nationals.44
The principle which suffered the most from this new step in the EU integration 
was the principle of  equality. Indeed, if  such discriminations are tolerated in an 
internal market, where the one who does not participate in economic development 
could not pretend benefit from the same rights as the one who moved from one 
Member State to another in order to do so, working, providing services or selling 
goods for instance, a legal order which distinguishes itself  from the international 
legal order in the place it grants people, making them subjects of  law and establishing 
a citizenship, the Union not only places their rights at equal level with the ones 
recognized to States, but undeniably proclaims the will to move beyond its initial 
function as market. The direction pointing towards a political Union, fundamental 
rights and the principle of  equality, indispensable to democracy, are needed more 
vividly than ever.
The first dimension of  purely internal situations, as manifestation of  the 
principle of  conferral of  competences, keeps national and EU scopes of  law in 
separated boxes. In this frame, they are positive elements of  distinction between 
substances of  law. They reveal the different legal orders cohabitating within the EU 
legal system.45 However, their existence is also maintained thanks to the persistence 
40 C. Ritter, “Purely internal situations, reverse discrimination, Guimont, Dzodzi and Article 234” 
(2006), quoted in K. Lenaerts, “Civis europaeus sum: from the cross-border link to the status of  
citizen of  the Union”, footnote 7. 
41 P. Oliver, “Some reflections on the scope of  articles 28-30 TEC”, 2006, quoted in K. Lenaerts, 
“Civis europaeus sum: from the cross-border link to the status of  citizen of  the Union”, footnote 7. 
42 Judgment Zambrano, Case C-34/09, September 30, 2010, A. G. Opinion, para. 133.
43 Judgment McCarthy, Case C-202/13, November 25, 2010, A.G. Opinion, para. 39. On this 
subject, see H. Schermers, D. Waelbroeck, Judicial protection in the European Union, Kluwer Law 
International, 2001, 92: «whenever a Member State gives a preferential treatment to the nationals of  
other Member States as opposed to its own nationals, this should also amount to a discrimination 
prohibited by the Treaty». And also «the Court may be prepared, under certain circumstances, to 
prohibit reversed discrimination if  there is a sufficient relationship with the Community Law».
44 D. Kochenov, “A real European citizenship: a new jurisdiction test, a novel chapter in the 
development of  the Union in Europe”, in Columbia Journal of  European Law, Vol. 18, 2011, 72.
45 See M. Poiares Maduro, “Constitutional pluralism as the theory of  European constitutionalism”, 
in Estudos em homenagem ao Prof. Doutor José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, Vol. III, Coimbra Editora, 2012, 
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of  an intergovernmental logic allowing Member States to act as «sovereign», but to 
the detriment of  citizens and consequently, the Union as a whole. Contemplating 
purely internal situations from a procedural angle offers the possibility to counter 
the negative effects on citizenship created by a positive regulation of  competences 
between Member States and Union.
3. 1. 2. Purely internal situations or a procedural obstacle between citizens 
and the Union 
Since «movement is enough to bring the situation within the scope of  EU law»,46 
the condition of  cross-border element may also be understood as a mere procedural 
obstacle hindering citizens from accessing the substance of  EU legal corpus. In that 
scenario, when the cross-border conditionality is removed, «no national rules fall a 
priori outside the scope of  the Treaty».47 The litigations developed above48 are case 
in point of  this extension operated by the Court into exclusive competences of  the 
State thanks to an enlargement and even abstraction of  the condition of  movement. 
This evolution finds its source in the Court’s commitment to protect the corpus of  
fundamental rights guaranteed in Europe – such as found in the EU legal order, 
through the general principles of  law as well as the CFREU, but also in national 
constitutions and the European Convention of  Human Rights –,49 underlying 
motives guiding the Court’s extensive reasoning in matters of  citizenship.50
If  this is a legitimate aim, it is not without carrying its own consequences, as 
the extension of  fundamental rights via the status of  EU citizenship proportionately 
affects the integration process. In a nourished comparison with the making of  the 
United States of  America’s Federation, Beaud51 warns us of  the «centralizing» effects 
of  the use of  fundamental rights in Federation building. The federalizing process 
is discovered in its first phase when it «becomes competent in ensuring respect for 
the fundamental rights granted to its citizens».52 In this initial stage, the federal level 
intervenes in the life of  its citizens via the federated entities, which explains why the 
famous «Slaughterhouse cases»53 was so violently received as carrying for objective «to 
fetter and to degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the control of  
the Congress».54 The second step is taken when the federal level effectively protects 
these rights and does so according to the principle of  equality55 between citizens.56 
453, where one reads:  «we can conceive of  the EU and national legal orders as autonomous but 
part of  the same European legal system. For those practicing law in Europe, this European legal 
system implies a commitment to both legal orders and imposes an obligation to accommodate and 
integrate their respective claims».
46 E. Spaventa, “Seeing the woods despite the trees? On the scope of  Union citizenship and its 
constitutional effects”, CMLR, 45, 2008, 14. 
47 E. Spaventa, idem.  
48 See point 2. 
49 See Art.6 TEU and Preamble and Art.52 CFREU. 
50 J. Shaw, “Citizenship: contrasting dynamics at the interface of  integration and constitutionalism”, 
in EUI Working papers, RSCAS 2010/60, 2010, 6. 
51 O. Beaud, “Droits de l’Homme et du citoyen et forme politique /Le cas particulier de la 
Fédération”, in RUDH, 2004, 16-26. 
52 O. Beaud, idem. 
53 Supreme Court of  the United States, Slaughterhouse Cases, 14th April 1873, 83 U.S 36. 
54 E. Zoller, Les Grands arrêts de la Cour supreme des Etats-Unis, coll. Droit fondamentalfundamental, 
Paris, PUF, 2000, 25.
55 O. Beaud, “Droits de l’Homme et du citoyen et forme politique…”, footnote 23.
56 In the USA, this step was taken by the Supreme Court finally breaking away from the Dred Scott 
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This is the point at which we stand now, when EU law applies directly to citizens 
despite the absence of  movement. Granting protection to mobile as much as static 
citizens, thus «frontally contradicting the idea that States conserve in principle the 
exercise of  their competences in situations presenting no extraneous element»,57 the 
ECJ erases the borders between national and EU scopes of  law.
Needless to say the members of  the ECJ are well aware of  the consequences 
a total removal of  the condition of  movement allowing direct application of  
fundamental rights would have on the nature of  the Union,58 which constitutes a 
valid explanation for the step back operated in McCarthy59 and following judgments. 
Access to rights depending on competences thus depending on political will, an 
attempt to deepen integration and ensure equal protection of  fundamental rights to 
both mobile and static citizens, notwithstanding the absence of  a link with EU law, 
needs to be supported by an «unequivocal political statement from the constituent 
powers of  the EU».60 The cross-border conditionality illustrates the constant internal 
tensions faced by a EU born from movement. It seems necessary for the EU to find 
the equilibrium between competences guided by the idea of  movement and rights 
governed by the principle of  equality. 
4. The necessity of  thinking the Union beyond movement 
We have seen the potential effects of  the removal of  the condition of  
movement on the nature of  European integration, as well as the downfalls of  
maintaining the status quo. The reality of  the EU shows in fact that an intermediate 
between compartmentalization and centralization is possible. This possibility is 
clearly expressed in the clarifications brought by the McCarthy judgment, when the 
Court reaffirms that the absence of  a cross-border element is not an obstacle for 
a situation to fall within the ambit of  EU law, so long as can be brought back the 
proof  of  a link with EU law. In other words, even if  the Court consents to remove 
the cross-border conditionality, establishing a link with EU law remains a necessity 
to afford protection under the EU legal order. Consequently, flexibility is brought to 
the compartments created by the differentiation between migrant and static citizens, 
and yet, Union law does not become omnipresent. In analyzing the results of  this 
new method on the degree of  European integration, and in fine, on the nature of  the 
Union, one must then reason on the origins and essence of  EU law which will help 
in keeping the balance between the different levels of  exercise of  public power (4.1). 
Nonetheless, even if  the Union has not reached the stage of  omnipresence, relieving 
citizens from a pure market logic reminds us of  the urgency in establishing a vertical 
relationship between the EU and its citizens (4.2), a condition of  the viability of  a 
decision which denied slaves, the quality of  citizen, and who could therefore not expect protection 
from the Federal government or the Courts. Stating that the US Supreme Court had no competence 
in banning slavery, this case signed the beginning of  the civil war, Dred Scott v. John F.A Stanford, 1857.
57 E. Dubout, “Le défi de la délimitation du champ de la protection des droits fondamentaux par la 
Cour de Justice de l’Union Européenne », in European Journal of  Legal Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 1, Spring/
Summer 2013, 5-23.
58 Judgment Zambrano, Case C-34/09, September 30, 2010, A. G. Opinion, para. 173. A.G. 
Sharpston concludes her Opinion to Zambrano by comparing such an approach with the 
«federalising effect of  the American incorporation doctrine» which «would alter, in legal and 
political terms, the nature of  fundamental rights under EU law».
59 Judgment McCarthy, Case C-434/09, May 5, 2011.
60 Judgment Zambrano, Case C-34/09, September 30, 2010, A. G. Opinion, para. 173.
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Union beyond movement which will equally impulse a new vitality to a legal order 
still highly dependent on stato-centrism. 
4. 1. The necessity of  clarifying competences for the benefit of  rights
With regard to the individual citizen, until 2010-2011, citizenship was either an 
exclusive competence of  the Union in cases of  mobile citizenship or an exclusive 
competence of  the Member State in static wholly internal situations. In order to 
break the classic reasoning, A.G. Eleanor Sharpston places free movement rights 
neither in the sole hands of  the Union nor the States, but in the domain of  shared 
competences,61 thus rebalancing responsibilities between EU and Member States. 
Indeed, following an enlarged interpretation of  EU citizenship, the risks of  shattering 
the delimitation of  scopes of  law and areas of  competence are high. However, in 
a restrictive interpretation, reverse discrimination inevitably appear and grow in 
number, which, she explains, is of  course to the detriment of  citizens, but also to 
the detriment of  Member States, who are left with handling the deficiencies of  the 
EU legal order. What’s more, in both instances, citizens remain in a situation of  legal 
uncertainty, since a definite choice of  approach has not yet been taken by the Court. 
Keeping at the core of  her argument that even the noble desire to ensure the highest 
protection of  fundamental rights «must not lead to an usurpation of  competences»,62 
A.G. Sharpston makes an original proposal in juridical methodology, all kept in the 
frame and context of  the Union. The starting point of  this new reasoning stems 
from the cohabitation of  EU and national legal orders, made clear in the reference 
to the concept of  «equivalent protection» of  fundamental rights.63
This proposal could be resumed in the following terms: beyond the scope of  
Art. 51 (1) CFREU, Member States remain autonomous in relation of  fundamental 
rights protection, as long as it can be presumed that they ensure the essence of  the 
EU standard of  fundamental rights. However, in case of  systemic violation, this 
presumption is rebutted – and in such a case, individuals can rely on their status as 
EU citizens to seek redress before national courts.64 Such a proposition is in line 
with the idea that the Union constitutes a community of  rights65 built on a multi-
level constitutionalism: a community composed of  Member States guaranteeing at 
national level rights it also protects within itself. When the citizen, by virtue of  his 
or her European status, may seek protection before the ECJ to ensure protection of  
these rights, it is undeniable that EU citizenship is one of  rights. This qualification 
presents a number of  advantages. It keeps the concept within a functional ambit 
distinguishing it from nationality, thus protecting the national level and sticking to the 
principle that EU citizenship is not destined to replace national citizenship but rather 
completes it, albeit its fundamental vocation. However, the scope of  protection of  
fundamental rights by EU law is still an issue,66 and reveals the discrepancy of  a 
system in which competences are so difficult to attribute.
61 Judgment Zambrano, Case C-34/09, September 30, 2010, A. G. Opinion, para. 130.
62 Judgment Zambrano, Case C-34/09, September 30, 2010, A. G. Opinion, para. 162.
63 E. Dubout, “Le défi de la délimitation du champ de la protection des droits fondamentaux par la 
Cour de Justice de l’Union Européenne”, in European Journal of  Legal Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 1, Spring/
Summer 2013, 5-23.
64 See A. von Bogdandy (et al.), “Reverse Solange – protecting the essence of  fundamental rights 
against EU Member States”, in Common Market Law Review, Vol. 49, 2012, 491. 
65 Judgment Les Verts, Case C-294/83, April 23, 1986.
66 E. Dubout, “Le défi…”.
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4. 2. Establishing a vertical relation between citizens and the EU: condition 
of  viability of  a Union beyond movement
If  the European integration in its political aspect commands a shift in thought 
beyond movement, a complete abandonment of  the idea of  movement is not either 
acceptable, since it would freeze the Union in a state of  questionable legitimacy if  a 
certain number of  issues at its core are not tackled first. As much as we agree with 
the imperative of  pulling Union citizenship away from the economic logic, we do 
not fully agree that movement be understood merely as a synonym of  economic 
freedom. Indeed, Union citizenship was granted to Member States nationals by 
Treaty provisions thanks to the will of  its fostering institutions. Its activation relying 
on the exercise of  movement had two effects with regard to democracy. On the one 
hand, kept in the frame of  the democratic institutions in the Member States, EU 
citizenship reinforced the Union as constellation of  democracies.67 On the other 
hand, it distinguished itself  from national citizenship by the crucial role it gave the 
European person in the European construct. Building bridges between Member 
States by choosing to move and reside freely elsewhere than in his or her country 
of  nationality, the migrant citizen participated directly in creating the destiny of  the 
Union.68 By now including static citizens, has the Court not broken this bottom-up 
construction? Nonetheless, this argument needs to be put in its context, precisely 
in the light of  the intensity of  competences exercised by the Union and in fine, 
influencing the life of  those who move as much as those who stay still. 
This brings us to the final question on the vertical relation between the EU 
and its citizens, particularly important when the Union proclaims the autonomy of  
EU citizenship in a parallel effect as when it declared autonomy of  EU law vis-à-
vis national and international legal orders.69 When the ECJ declared that the Union 
formed a new legal order on the grounds that it became part of  national legal orders 
and created rights and obligations towards individuals, now recognized as EU citizens, 
it confirmed that the degree of  integration based on the quantity and quality of  the 
transfer of  competences operated to the benefit of  the Union removed it from the 
category of  international organization. But the international legal order recognizes 
States as subjects of  law, a fact which has a significant impact on the procedural 
and substantial democratic requirements to be respected. When a legal order also 
recognizes individuals as subjects of  law, it multiplies the number of  addressees of  
the norms its legal order produces and proportionally increases its diffusion in their 
lives. Thus gaining in weight, the necessity of  submitting it to consent grows.
The crucial moment at which the Union stands now is the need to create its own 
vertical relation with the citizens it protects. The legal basis already exists in article 
67 See M. Poiares Maduro, “Constitutional pluralism as the theory of  European constitutionalism”, 
in Estudos em homenagem ao Prof. Doutor José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, Vol. III, Coimbra Editora, 2012, 
461, where the Author identifies three main sources of  constitutional and democratic added value 
that the process of  EU integration and EU law can bring: 1) promotes inclusiveness in national 
democracies by requiring national political processes to take into account out-of-state interests 
and open themselves to the nationals of  other Member States; 2) allows national democracies to 
collectively regain control over transnational processes that evade their individual control; 3) 
contributes a form of  self-imposed external constitutional discipline on national democracies, 
rationalizing national policies that have become path-dependent or captured by certain interests.
68 As we have previously developed, this citizenship based on movement organised a person’s right 
to be recognised by the host polity. 
69 Judgment Van Gend & Loos, Case C-26/62, February 5, 1963.
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9 TEU, by which «In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of  the 
equality of  its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies». This means, in terms of  process, that the Union instead of  
moving forward stands at a point where its movement must stop and diffuse itself  
in all its levels to effectively reach citizens and create its own social interlocutor. 
Unfortunately, granting rights might prove insufficient to create a viable community 
as a whole. The concept of  nationality developed in Nation States created a vertical 
relation between citizens and public power grounded on a sentiment of  belonging, 
incarnated in the idea of  identity.70 But this verticality may equally exist within the 
concept of  citizenship, with the advantage of  being objective where nationality is 
subjective. A citizenship based on the level of  protection of  rights thus presents 
itself  as an interesting tool to build a vertical relation between EU citizens and 
EU institutions, although it is not without raising questions of  its own. First of  
all, without a clarification of  competences and scope of  law, would it not lead to 
creating a dangerous situation of  double standard?71 Second, does a citizenship of  
rights have the capacity to take into account the political dimension of  citizenship, 
i.e., citizenship as right to political autonomy?72
Nonetheless, for a vertical relation to be one of  dialogue and respect, it also 
needs obligations, not only top-bottom obligations of  institutions towards citizens, 
but also of  citizens vis-à-vis these institutions, because only then will it be able to 
determine whether it holds an independent «power of  being loved»73 because 
it offers European citizens, if  not something more, at least something else than 
national citizenship.74 Departing from a philosophy based on movement, the Union, 
thanks to the pro-activeness of  the ECJ, has shown its full respect to European 
citizens. But for this relationship to develop, it is urgent that the Union gains their 
respect. If  it is possible to imagine a European social contract in the absence of  a 
demos in the classic sense, namely due to the fact that «the term ‘peoples’, which is 
not defined, may have different meanings in the Member States and languages of  
the Union»,75 the meaning of  social contract on the other hand, does not change: 
because it is a contract, albeit social, it requires the presence of  two parties, both 
endowed with rights and obligations. For this to happen, EU citizenship must step 
out of  the courtroom and enter the political forum.
5. By way of  conclusion…
If  the crisis has brought some benefit it is that: Europeans are getting to know 
one another. A pleasant story could be very useful to show that. The granting of  EU 
financial assistance to Portugal depended of  the agreement of  all Member States of  the 
Eurozone – and Finland threatened to oppose it. So, a video was spontaneously posted 
on the internet, in a funny and nice tone, entitled «What the Finns need to know about 
70 See point 1.  
71 Joint concurring Opinion Rozakis, Tulkens, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki to ECHR 
decision Bosphorus, n.°45036/98, June 30, 2005. 
72 See M. Benlolo-Carabot, Les fondements juridiques de la citoyenneté européenne, Coll. Thèses, Brulyant, 2007.
73 E. Zoller, Aspects international de droit constitutionnel. Contribution à la théorie de la fédération d’Etats, 
R.C.A.D.I, t. 294, 2002, 152. 
74 Judgment Maria Teixeira, Case C-480/08, February 23, 2010. The Teixeira judgment is an example 
of  the birth of  a form of  European solidarity.
75 Judgment M. G. Eman et O. B. Sevinger, Case C-300/04 and C-145/04, September 12, 2006, para. 71.
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Portugal».76 The video lasts around 6 minutes and discloses information as diverse as: 
«Napoleon tried to conquer Portugal 3 times and failed»; «We divided the world in 2, 
with Spain, and we got the better part: Brazil»; «We have more mobile phones than 
inhabitants: 60% are NOKIA»; «Portugal was the first country in the world to abolish 
the death penalty»; «60% of  Americans think that Portugal is a province of  Spain – 
so do same Spaniards»; «In September 1999, nearly a million and half  of  Portuguese 
people manifested, forcing the Indonesian to leave East Timor territory», etc. And the 
video finished on a more serious note, with long queues images destined to collect 
donations and the following message: «But one of  the largest volunteer campaigns ever 
in Portugal was in 1940. We collected tons of  clothes and cereals to support another 
peripheral, poor and starving country. This country was Finland». 
The quick response entitled «What the Portuguese need to know about Finland»77 
adopted the same informative and nice tone – one of  the facts was that a half-Finnish 
and half-Portuguese girl had won the «Finnish Idols Song Competition». The conclusion 
also brought a more serious note: «Here we could mock you on the difficult financial 
situation of  Portugal. We don’t, because our hearts and minds are with you. With love, 
Finland». The end of  the story is known: the approval was granted. With the crisis, 
Portuguese and Finns finally realized this simple idea which directs any federative or 
multilevel system: everything that happens in Finland concerns Portugal and everything 
that happens in Portugal concerns Finland.
76 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6tjXdDFSEIU.
77 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MgVugxNZEQc.
